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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This brief contains three sections. The first responds to the hospital's
arguments that the trial court made reversibly erroneous evidentiary rulings in
favor of Mrs. Haase. The second argues that the trial court made erroneous
rulings prejudicial to Mrs. Haase. The third contains Mrs. Haase's reply
arguments in support of her request for judgment in the amount of $820,000, as
supported by the jury's post-verdict affidavits and in-court declarations.

SECTION ONE
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR FAVOR OF MRS. HAASE.
I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
PORTIONS OF THE SURGEON'S PERSONAL MEDICAL
RECORDS.
A.

. . . Because The Admitted Records Were the Best Evidence of
What a Member of The Hospital's Medical Staff. Credentialinq
Committee. Medical Executive Committee and Governing Board
Knew Concerning the Surgeon's Impairments and Drug
Dependencies.

A central issue in this case was what the hospital knew or should have
known concerning the surgeon's physical limitations, emotional disorders and
drug dependencies. The hospital's entire argument concerning Dr. Madsen's
treatment records grandly ignores the fact that at the time the surgeon was
-1-

credentialed, Dr. Madsen was a member of the hospital's Medical Executive
Committee, Credentialing Committee and Governing Board. (R. 227, 656, 660;
973-74; 1104-05).

Throughout the entire time the surgeon operated at the

hospital, Dr. Madsen was his primary care physician and a member of the
hospital's medical staff. What Dr. Madsen knew was therefore chargeable to the
hospital. Dr. Madsen himself acknowledged that: the confidential nature of
physician/patient communications must yield when disclosure is necessary to
protect the public interest or the welfare of an individual; a physician has an
ethical obligation to report an impaired colleague to the hospital's chief of staff;
and a physician involved in granting hospital privileges has an ethical duty to be
guided primarily by concern for the safety of patients. (Tr. 1099-1103; See also
AMA's Code of Ethics).
If the hospital didn't know what Dr. Madsen knew, it should have known. If
it was ignorant, its ignorance was the fault of its own agent and medical staff
member.
Dr. Madsen 's testimony and chart reveal that Dr. Madsen was aware of
the impairments documented and quantified during the last few years of the
surgeon's service as an orthopedic surgeon in the U.S. Army.1 Dr. Madsen's
1

During the first office visit on May 4,1993, Dr. Hawkes delivered to Dr.
Madsen his medical records from the military. Dr. Madsen read those records.
Although the court did not allow those records to be admitted, it did allow Dr.
Madsen to be questioned concerning them. Dr. Madsen acknowledged, based
on review of the military records, that in February of 1989, Dr. Hawkes was
-2-

testimony and chart also shed shockingly bright light on the surgeon's sad
condition from early May of 1993 through the date he operated on Mrs. Haase in
March of 1996. 2
receiving disability compensation from the military due to: limited motion in
cervical spine; limited motion in lumbar spine; paralysis of upper radicular nerve
group; shoulder condition, left upper; shoulder condition, right upper; limited
motion of forearm, left upper; loss of motion of thumb, right upper. The records
reflect residual vision problems due to"Homer's Syndrome" which "causes him
difficulty driving at night due to depth discrepancies, and is more pronounced with
fatigue, causing some difficulty towards the end of an operation". The records
also state: "Dr. Hawkes is a pediatric orthopedic surgeon who is definitely
restricted in his medical activities because of his multiple service connected
injuries". The records state that due to subluxation and restriction of motion in his
hand and fingers, "both thumb and index finger are symptomatic and make
problems when he's operating". (Tr. 1106-1110).
2

On May 4, 1993, Dr. Madsen learned that the surgeon:

suffered from significant chronic pain and the severe, recurrent migraine
headaches "associated with nausea, vomiting and inability to concentrate";
experienced numbness and tingling in his right arm and chronic pain in
both shoulders, low back, feet and knees;
had used "multiple pain medications" for his problems and was selfadministering Demerol in addition to Fiorinal #3 and Restoril;
had promised his wife that he would no longer self-administer narcotics;
had been rated 90% disabled by the armed services; and
was taking hypertension medication.
In his own assessment of the surgeon, Dr. Madsen listed several maladies
including: migraine headaches, chronic pain stemming mainly from cervical disk
disease, multiple orthopedic related problems, a history of pulmonary injury,
hepatic cysts . . . , rheumatoid arthritis, and hypertension.

-3-

Because Dr. Madsen's patient chart on the surgeon contained the best
evidence of what he knew concerning the surgeon's condition and provided the
only reliable means of testing the truthfulness of his testimony, it would have
been reversible error for the trial court not to have allowed introduction of those
treatment records.

On his first visit, Dr. Madsen gave the surgeon a prescription for 60 Fiorinal
#3 tablets with 2 refills. On July 1,1993 - less than 60 days later, the surgeon
requested another prescription of this opiate narcotic drug. He asked Dr.
Madsen to prescribe Demerol vials but Dr. Madsen declined because he had
been given those from other surgeons and was self-administering the medication.
Nine days later, Dr. Madsen approved the administration of 100 mg of Demerol.
Nine days after that - on May 24, he administered 150 mg of Demerol to the
surgeon. Three days later he again administered 150 mg of Demerol. These
administrations of Demerol continue on June 9 and June 10. Following the June
10 administration, Dr. Madsen made arrangements for the surgeon's son to drive
him home because he "didn't want him operating the car under the influence of
that injection". Seven days later, the surgeon requested and received another
shot of Demerol as he did five days later. The surgeon received four injections of
Demerol in June of 1993. He also received prescriptions for Fiorinal #3 with 2
refills. (120 doses in total). The Demerol administrations continued with great
frequency.
The surgeon had high blood pressure at each visit. He was also put on anti
depressant medication. His hypertension continued despite his being placed on
Cardizem and, later, Procardia. The surgeon also received prescription sleeping
medication (Ambien) which Dr. Madsen acknowledged could exacerbate and
amplify the sedating properties of the narcotic pain medication he continued to
take. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12;Tr. 976-1106)
-4-

B.

The Hospital Failed to Object at the Time the Court Granted Mrs.
Haase's Offer to Admit the Records And. Therefore. Waived
Whatever Objection it Had.

The relevant pages of Dr. Madsen's treatment records on the surgeon were
first offered into evidence on the third day of trial, March 13. (Tr. 542-543). The
trial court declined to receive the records at that time, indicating their having
finally been produced did not make them admissible, without the accompanying
testimony of the physician who created them. (Tr. 543). The court stated:"... I
think the doctor's got to testify about them". At that time, the hospital's counsel
stated: "Your Honor, you've expressed my objection brilliantly. Thank you." (Tr.
543). When Dr. Madsen took the stand to testify the following Monday, the
relevant portions of his chart were again offered into evidence. (Tr. 592). The
hospital again objected and the court indicated it would withhold a ruling until
satisfied that sufficient foundation had been established through Dr. Madsen's
testimony to warrant admission of the records. Dr. Madsen's testimony covers
the next 145 pages of the trial transcript. At the conclusion of his testimony, the
records were again offered into evidence. At this time, the hospital made no
objection. (Tr. 1118). Apparently, the hospital was as convinced as the court
that the necessary foundation for admission of the records had been established
by Dr. Madsen's testimony. In any event, the hospital waived whatever objection
it still may have had by failing to object at the time the court granted Mrs. Haase's
offer to admit the records.
-5-

C.

The Hospital Knew What the Records Contained Nearly Three
Years Before the Case Got to Trial and Their Late Production
Prejudiced Mrs. Haase. Not the Hospital.

The hospital contends the trial court erred in allowing reference at trial to
the surgeon's personal medical records because "the defense had no opportunity
to review the records or depose the physician who created them" (Brief of
Appellee/Cross Appellant, p.7). It states:
The release of the records was so untimely as to create
unfair prejudice. It allowed the Hospital no opportunity
to depose Dr. Madsen regarding his records or even to
discuss the records with him informally prior to his
testimony.
(Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant, p. 8). These assertions are meritless.3
The Hospital's representative, Risk Manager Debra Spafford, obtained
access to and scrutinized Dr. Madsen's records on June 15,1999 - some 13
months after this action was commenced and nearly 3 years before the case
came to trial! (Transcript at 981). The hospital was fully aware that Dr. Madsen
was the surgeon's treating physician from 1993 on. (Ron Perry depo at 43-44;
trial transcript at 172). Mrs. Haase designated Dr. Ace Madsen as a possible

3

As is the hospital's suggestion that the production of Dr. Madsen's
records was ordered only in "another case". (Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant,
p. 7). On March 12, 2002, the trial court signed an "Order on Dr. Madsen's
Medical Records" in this case. That order directed the immediate production of
Dr. Madsen's treatment records. The order was hand delivered to the hospital's
counsel on the day it was signed. (R. 983-4).
-6-

trial witness in the formal Designation of Expert Witnesses her counsel sent to
the hospital's counsel some 10 months before trial. (R. 496-500, Para.11 ).
The hospital could have deposed Dr. Madsen at any time and questioned
him freely concerning his treatment of the surgeon and his knowledge of the
surgeon's impairments and drug dependencies. It is disingenuous in the extreme
for the hospital to claim "unfair prejudice" from the late release of Dr. Madsen's
medical records. If anyone was unfairly prejudiced by the late release of those
records, it was Mrs. Haase, not the hospital. The hospital was given access to
those records nearly 3 years before she was.
D.

Reliance on the Records by Mrs. Haase's Credentialing Expert
Was Only Incidental to His Opinions and Conclusions.

Dr. Pasternak's review of and comment on the surgeon's treatment records
was hardly a major factor in the trial. He had concluded the surgeon was
dangerous and the hospital had breached its duty to Mrs. Haase long before he
was allowed to review the surgeon's treatment records. (See Dr. Pasternak's 123-02 depo transcript). His additional comments, after reviewing those records,
as to the red flags they raised were not particularly dispositive. A great quantity
of strong and compelling evidence, aside from Dr. Pasternak's opinion, was
presented that the surgeon was indeed impaired and dangerous. (See, e.g., the
testimony of Dr. William Stryker at Tr. 1263-88). In any event, there was nothing
preventing the hospital from trying to retain an expert to testify that Dr. Madsen's
-7-

illuminating treatment records do not reflect treatment of a dangerously impaired
surgeon. Again, its Risk Manager knew what those records revealed nearly 3 full
years before the case came to trial.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING
THE JURY TO HEAR SWORN DEPOSITION
TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE SURGEON IN MRS.
HAASE'S CASE AGAINST HIM BECAUSE SUCH
TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE UNDER
SEVERAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE.
The hospital incorrectly characterizes the trial court's decision to allow the
jury to hear the prior deposition testimony of the surgeon as a determination of
law, reviewable for correctness with no deference to the trial court. The
determination was in reality an evidentiary ruling which required the trial court to
balance factors pertaining to admissibility. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc..
977 P.2d 508, 511 (Utah App. 1999). A trial court is to be granted broad
discretion in its decision to admit or exclude evidence and this court is to
"presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the
record clearly shows to the contrary." State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207,1210 n.4
(Utah App. 1991). In this instance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The prior deposition testimony of the surgeon which the trial court allowed
to be read to the jury consisted of statements by the surgeon that:
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He had significant physical impairments and ongoing problems with chronic
pain;
he had obtained a medical disability discharge from the Army while serving
as an orthopedic surgeon during the Desert Storm conflict shortly before
starting up his orthopedic surgery practice in Vernal;
he had received a 90% impairment rating from the Veterans Administration
based on rheumatoid arthritis;
he was impaired by restricted range of motion in his right thumb, left ankle,
neck and lumbar spine; his eyes "are not equal" which "drives me nuts";
he was diagnosed as having Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and was
started on Serotonin uptake inhibitors;
following his medical disability discharge from the military in 1992, he
attended a pain management clinic in Provo and another in Salt Lake;
he underwent neck surgery in Dallas, Texas in February of 1995;
he fell off a horse while trying to gain admission to a high school football
game in September of 1995;
he spent four days at the Wasatch Canyons Day Spring Clinic in the Fall of
1995, where his treating physician was "the head addictionologist for the
State";
while practicing orthopedic surgery in Vernal, he consumed various
narcotic drugs on a regular basis including Methadone, Sublimaze patches,
Zoloft, Deporal, Relafen, Lodine, Prilosec and Ultram.
(Trial transcript at pp. 444 - 446).
Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence contain exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Those found in Rule 803 apply regardless of whether the declarant
is available as a witness at trial. Those found in 804 apply when the declarant is
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unavailable. The surgeon's prior deposition testimony is admissible under
provisions of both rules.
A.

The Surgeon's Statements of His "Then Existing Physical
Condition" Were Admissible Under Rule 803(3).

Among statements not excluded by the hearsay rule are statements "of the
declarant's then existing . . . physical condition (such as . . . pain, and bodily
health)". Rule 803(3). Any statements made by the surgeon in depositions
concerning his physical condition, pain or bodily health were expressly admissible
under this recognized exception to the hearsay rule.

B.

The Surgeon's Statements Against Interest Were Admissible
Under Rule 804(b)(3).

When a declarant is unavailable because of death, any statement made by
him is admissible if it was
at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to c i v i l . . . liability . . .
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made this statement unless believing it
to be true.
Rule 804(b)(3). The statements Mrs. Haase sought to use in this case were all
made by the surgeon in cases in which he was a defendant. There would have
been no motive for the surgeon to have testified untruthfully about his having
received a 90% disability rating from the VA or that he suffered from a wide
variety of range of motion limitations and impairments. It was likewise against
-10-

his interest to reveal the identity of all the heavy prescription medications he was
taking, to admit that he fell off his horse while attempting to gain access to a high
school football game, and to acknowledge that shortly after that falling-off-thehorse-incident, he was admitted at the Day Spring Clinic in Salt Lake. Such
statements by the surgeon were so far against his own interest that a reasonable
person in his position would not have made them unless believing them to be
true. The surgeon had no motive to prevaricate. His statements were therefore
properly admitted.

Q.

The Surgeon's Statements Were Admissible As Former
Testimony Under Rule 804(b)(1).

When a declarant is unavailable because of death, his prior deposition
testimony is admissible when it was given:
in a deposition taken in compliance with the law in the
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil
action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony
by direct, cross, or re-direct examination.
Rule 804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence. Here, the depositions of the surgeon in
the Gottfredson and Haase cases occurred in civil actions then pending against
the surgeon. The surgeon and his counsel in those cases had a motive identical
to the motive of the hospital in this case: to defeat liability by demonstrating the
surgeon was fit and able. The surgeon and his counsel had opportunity to
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develop his testimony by cross examination during those depositions. There is
no basis for assuming that had the hospital's counsel been present, he would
have done anything that the surgeon's own counsel didn't do to "develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or re-direct examination".

Rule 804(b)(1), U.R.E.

Courts which have considered the "predecessor in interest" requirement
have held it does not require "privity or common property interest" but "rather, a
shared interest in the material facts and outcome of the case will create such an
interest." New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. PPG Industries. 197 F.3d 96, at

,

fn. 21 (3rd Cir. 1999); See also Llovd v. American Export Lines. Inc.. 580 F.2d
1179, 1185-87 (3rd Cir. 1978). In New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson.
888 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1989), the court found that if a "like motive" to develop the
same material facts is present, the predecessor in interest requirement is met.
The burden of establishing a lack of similar motive of witness examination is on
the party against whom the former testimony is being offered. Supermarket of
Marlinaton v. Meadow Gold Dairies. 874 F. Supp. 721 (WDVa. 1994).

The

hospital has not met and cannot meet that burden.
The surgeon's sworn deposition statements were made in a civil action in
which he was attempting to defeat liability by demonstrating he was a fit and able
surgeon. His interest as a defendant was identical to the hospital's interest in this
action. He was capably represented by counsel who had ample opportunity and
an identical motive to "develop", rebut or clarify his testimony.

-12-

D.

The Surgeon's Statements were admissible under the
Catch-all Exceptions of Rules 803 and 804 Because They
Carried Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness.

Hearsay statements are admissible under Rule 803(24) and 804(5) even
when they do not qualify under any other recognized exception when they have
"equivalent substantial guarantees of trustworthiness". The "catch all" exceptions
set forth in these two rules are identical. They provide for the admission of
a statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent substantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence.
Rule 803(24); See also Rule 804(5). Here, the surgeon's sworn deposition
statements were offered as evidence of material facts. They were more probative
on the points for which they were offered than any other evidence Mrs. Haase
could procure through reasonable efforts.4 The general purposes of our rules of
4

Mrs. Haase attempted to obtain the surgeon's military discharge records
but found they could not be obtained without the authorization of the surgeon's
widow, who refused to authorize their release. The massive pleading file in this
case reflects Mrs. Haase's dogged but fruitless attempts to obtain, prior to trial,
records from the V.A. and from other providers of medical and psychological care
to the surgeon. When she was finally able to obtain, the Day Spring records, the
hospital refused to stipulate to their authenticity. Her counsel therefore had to
take no fewer than 3 depositions to establish the truth of information contained in
those records. Ultimately, the trial court refused to allow admission of any portion
of the Day Spring records. (Tr. 1196).
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evidence and the interests of justice were best served by the trial court's
admission of the surgeon's statements into evidence. Because the statements
carried substantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the trial court was correct in
allowing them to be heard by the jury.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
THE RESULTS OF THE SURGEON'S FINGER
DEXTERITY TESTS. THE FACT THAT THE TESTS
WERE ADMINISTERED 14 MONTHS AFTER THE
SURGERY ON MRS. HAASE GOES TO THE WEIGHT,
NOT THE ADMISSIBILITY, OF THEIR RESULTS.
Neither the dexterity tests administered to the surgeon during his May,
1997 deposition nor the test results constitute "hearsay". By stipulation, the
testing was videotaped. The videotape was available for review by counsel and
the court at any time. The tests were administered by a Utah Department of
Work Services employee in Vernal who was subpoenaed to testify at trial and did
in fact testify at trial. She was cross examined by the hospital's counsel in front of
the jury concerning the tests she administered and the results of those tests.
Although the hospital was not present when the court in Vernal granted
leave to administer the dexterity tests, the position it likely would have taken was
strenuously and valiantly argued by the surgeon's own able counsel, Mr. David
Epperson. The hospital's presumed objection to the administration of the
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dexterity tests could not have been presented more forcefully or vehemently than
presented by Mr. Epperson. The admissibility of the dexterity tests and test
results was thoroughly briefed long before the trial occurred. (See, R.175-211
and 304-336). 5
The fact that the tests were administered 14 months after the surgeon
operated on Mrs. Haase does not render their results irrelevant or inadmissible.
That fact goes only to weight, not to admissibility. The hospital's counsel very
eloquently argued to the jury that they should assign little weight to the tests
because of the time gap. (See Tr. 1498-99).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Utah Department
of Work Services employee, Kathleen Williams, to testify at trial concerning her
administration of the dexterity tests and the results of those tests.

5

In October of 2000, Mrs. Haase counsel presented written argument to
the trial court stating Mrs. Haase's position: The test results are not hearsay
because (a) the testing was videotaped and could be reliably confirmed by the
videotape and (b) the tests were administered by a person who could appear in
court and authenticate the test results. The hearsay rule is to prevent unreliable
information from being used as evidence. The dexterity testing information was
reliable. Its reliability was confirmable both by live testimony of the person
administering the tests and by the videotaping of the testing itself.
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IV.

THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE ADMISSION OF DR.
LONNIE PAULOS' "UNEDITED"VIDEOTAPED TRIAL
TESTIMONY BECAUSE THE HOSPITAL MADE ONLY
FOUR OBJECTIONS DURING THE EXAMINATION,
THE OBJECTIONS WERE EACH NON MATERIAL
AND OVERRULEABLE, AND THERE WAS NOTHING
OBJECTIONABLE TO DELETE. THE JURY HEARD
NOTHING IT SHOULD NOT HAVE HEARD.
The formal notice of Dr. Paulos' deposition expressly stated the deposition
would be videotaped for use at trial in lieu of Dr. Paulos' personal appearance. It
was clear when Dr. Paulos was deposed that Mrs. Haase intended to use his
deposition at trial in lieu of his personal appearance. The hospital had notice that
any objections it wished to make to his testimony should be made on the record
during the deposition. (Tr. 142).
On page 17 of its brief, the hospital quotes a passage from the trial
transcript which supposedly reflects the court's reservations about allowing the
jury to hear Dr. Paulos' unedited videotape. The passage indicates the court
would have sustained some objections made during the videotape. That
passage, however, had nothing to do with Dr. Paulos' videotaped testimony. It
concerned the videotaped testimony of Dr. Richard Jackson! (Tr. 509 -511).
The hospital has raised no objection to the use of Dr. Jackson's unedited
videotaped testimony at trial. The quoted passage, therefore, is both
inappropriate and misleading in a discussion of Dr. Paulos' videotaped testimony.
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During the entire deposition of Dr. Paulos, the hospital made only four
objections. Two simply complained that the question posed by counsel misstated
the deposition testimony of the hospital's CEO, Ron Perry. After the first such
objection was made, Mrs. Haase's counsel responded that "the transcript says
whatever it says" and invited the hospital's counsel to correct whatever
misstatement he felt had been made. The hospital's counsel declined that
invitation. (Paulos depo at pp. 8-9)
The second such objection occurred on page 11 of the deposition:
Q.

Now, I'm not going to try and misstate and I
haven't so far tried to misstate Ron Perry's
testimony, but I think he testified that during the
recruiting process of Dr. Hawkes, Dr. Hawkes told
him that he had had a falling out with his
colleagues at Cottonwood Hospital, including you
and Dr. Rosenberg, and he indicated to . . . Ron
Perry that the reason for that falling out was of
jealousy over his, Dr. Hawkes, having some
preeminence in laser surgery.

A.

Objection, misstates testimony.6

6

The hospital's counsel is correct that Mr. Perry had not used the word
"jealousy". However, counsel's characterization is arguably fair. Mr. Perry said
this concerning what the surgeon reported to him about his falling out with his
orthopedic colleagues in Salt Lake:

Thomas Hawkes was in the forefront of laser shoulder surgery . . . and in
orthopedic services, among surgeons, one upsmanship is good and bad.
He was receiving recognition for his ability to perform this process called
laser shoulder surgery, and Lonnie Paulos and Tom Rosenberg did not
believe that this procedure was a good procedure and so they had a falling
out.
(Ron Perry depo at 33).
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This objection was also not material. Both sides had full opportunity to explore
with Dr. Paulos whether there had been a falling out and, if so, the reasons for it.
Dr. Paulos testified he was not even aware of any "falling out". (Lonnie Paulos
depo at 11).
Had the foregoing two objections been ruled on before trial, they would
have resulted in no editing. There was simply nothing to delete. Moreover, the
objections were to matters which were in no way material and could not have had
any substantial impact on the jury's deliberations of the real issues in the case.
A third objection was merely to foundation. It occurred when Dr. Paulos
was asked when, if at all, he became aware of the surgeon having any sort of
problems with drug use. This objection, like the others, proved entirely
immaterial. Dr. Paulos responded that he was not aware of such problems until
after the surgeon's death. His reservations about the surgeon's being a danger
to patients was based entirely on his appraisal of the surgeon's skills and
judgment in performing surgeries, not upon any impairment related to drug use.
(Paulos depo at 19, lines 16-20).
The only other objection was made when Dr. Paulos was asked this
hypothetical question:
Q.

. . . if you had been contacted . . . in early March
of 1996 by anyone associated with the recredentialing of Dr. Hawkes, what kind of
response would you have given by then [as to
whether Dr. Hawkes was a danger to patients]?
-18-

The hospital objected to this question on the grounds of "foundation, form of the
question, relevance". (Paulos depo at 16, lines 2-3). The objection to "form of
the question" is patently meritless

I lie objection as lu inundation is likewise

meritless. Clearly, Dr. Paulos had the foundational knowledge to testify how he
would have responded to such a question in March of 1996 or, if he didn't, he
could have said so. The only other ground offered by the hospital was
"relevance". Clearly, what was knowable by the hospital in early March of I'tMi i
before this surgeon operated on Mrs. Haase was relevant to whether the hospital
breached its duty to protect Mrs. Haase from a dangerously unfit surgeon.
'I he hospital1'i own i ledenlialinq expert I tnijh (Greeley testified ilminq the
trial that the surgeon would have been due for re-credentialing in either 1995 or
1996. (R. 1170-71). Since Dr. Paulos had performed repair and revision surgeries

appropriate person for the hospital to have contacted during the re-credentialing
process.
Dr Paulos was lalei asked how he would have responded il the hospital
had made the same inquiry in 1995. Interestingly, the hospital raised no
objection to that question ~ _ Paulos responded that he would have provided a
"highly negative" response, \raulos dep at Mi, lines 5-6, page 19, line 9),
In summary, the failure to "edit" the Paulos deposition was immaterial. The
jury heard nothing that it should not have heard. The hospital raised a total of
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four objections during the testimony and all of them were inconsequential.7

7

The hospital made no objection to the "meat" of Dr. Paulos'
testimony, which was his authentication of his written response to a letter from
Mrs. Haase's counsel in January of 2002. The letter to Dr. Paulos began with the
following question, typed in bold-faced letters:
If the administrators or medical executive committee
of Ashley Valley Hospital had asked you in early
1993 or at any time thereafter whether Dr. Thomas
Hawkes was a danger to patients by reason of being
an impaired or compromised provider or due to
poor judgment or inadequate skill, what would your
truthful response have been?
(Exhibit 1 to Lonnie Paulos deposition; see also page 6 of Paulos deposition).
Dr. Paulos responded in writing to that letter as follows:
I have received your letter concerning Dr. Thomas
Hawkes dated 1/24/02. My response to the question
that you posed is that patients would have been in
danger...
(Exhibit 2 to Lonnie Paulos deposition; see also pp. 6-7 of Paulos deposition).
Another critical feature of Dr. Paulos' deposition testimony to which the
hospital raised no objection was his recollection of having in 1993 verbally
informed the hospital's administrator, Ron Perry, of his serious reservations about
Dr. Hawkes. When shown a copy of a questionnaire form allegedly sent to him
by a secretary of the hospital's credentialing committee, Dr. Paulos indicated he
may in fact have received the questionnaire. The hospital had no record of any
written response from him and he did not recall having made one. He did,
however, recall having contacted Ron Perry by telephone to express his negative
appraisal of the surgeon. (Lonnie Paulos depo at 14 -18).
Although Mr. Perry denied receiving such a call (Tr. 1165), he did admit
learning in 1993 that Dr. Paulos held negative views about Dr. Hawkes' operating
skills and his safety to patients. (Tr. 1165, line 24 -1166, line 2).
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V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DR.
MARGARET ENSIGN TO EXPRESS HER OPINION
THAT THE SURGEON WAS IMPAIRED AT THE TIME
OF THE HAASE SURGERY BECAUSE HER OPINION
WAS SOLIDLY FOUNDED ON SE 'ERAL RELEVANT
FACTORS WHICH SHE WAS COMPETENT TO
CONSIDER.
The hospital suggests that Dr. Ensign's "sole basis" for believing the
surgeon was impaired "was her conclusion that the post-operative note written by
the surgeon stnuiuMt COIIIUMU1) MM*I in- "HMstonl" (RiM "I AppHleeA .ess
Appellant at p. 20). That is not correct.8
Dr. Ensign's opinion that the surgeon was impaired was based on several
factor;., other linn the suiyeons operative report being "anatomically inaccurate,

8

Dr. Ensign testified that she had reviewed both the pre-surgery and post
surgery x-rays of Mrs. Haase's right knee, as well as x-rays of Mrs. Haase's
uninjured left knee, for comparison purposes. She also studied, in addition to the
surgeon's official report of his surgery on the right knee, the hospital chart and
records reflecting Mrs. Haase's hospitalization before and after that surgery. In
addition, she read the office notes, history and physical and operative report of
Dr. Richard Jackson, the surgeon who undertook to repair the severe patellar
baja created during the Vernal surgeon's operation. She studied Dr. Jackson's
deposition testimony and the drawing Dr. Jackson made of what he found in the
knee when he opened it up, which she compared with the drawing Dr. Hawkes
had made to reflect what he claimed to have found during his surgery.
(R.
1240). Her opinion was based on the pertinent x-rays, operative reports,
deposition transcripts, the "nature,... angle,... location and . . . severity of the
patellar tendon laceration . . . Dr. Jackson observed in his repair surgery" and on
her scrutiny of the operative report the Vernal surgeon dictated on the day he
performed his surgery. (R. 1246-47).
-21-

. . . unclear, confusing, [and] incomprehensible". (R. 1250). Those factors
include the fact that what the surgeon described as his surgery "was totally
different from what Dr. Jackson found at his surgery" (R. 1251, lines 19-21; 1250,
lines 3-5).

They also included Dr. Ensign's belief, as a trained physician, that an

unimpaired physician would not prescribe vigorous physical therapy immediately
post-op for a patient with patellar baja as bad as this patient had (R. 1253-54),
would not prescribe a duragesic patch - which is a slow releasing narcotic
medication - for treatment of acute pain in a patient following surgery (R. 1254),
and would not fail to inform the patient that she had been left with severe patellar
baja after the surgery. (R. 1254).
The hospital's suggestion that Dr. Ensign was unqualified to render the
opinion she rendered is also without merit. Dr. Ensign testified that in addition to
being a board certified radiologist with a sub specialty in musculoskeletal
radiology, she took several courses during her medical training dealing with the
effects of prescription pain medications, Class I, II and III narcotics, Demerol,
Morphine, etc. She testified she had occasion to prescribe Demerol and other
prescription pain medications during her career as a physician. She also testified
that prior to becoming a physician, she worked as a high school teacher and
athletic coach. She trained and worked with athletes who sustained broken
bones in their lower extremities. (R. 1241-1242). An objective review of Dr.
Ensign's entire testimony at trial reveals she was well qualified to render the
-22-

opinion she rendered The trial courl did not err in so finding
The trial court's decision to allow Dr. Ensign to testify by telephone was not
an abuse of discretion. The court heard evidence as to why it was virtually

equities, concluded that she could testify by telephone. It is likely her testifying by
telephone was more prejudicial to Mrs. Haase than to the hospital.
1 here is no IMSIS toi < om hiding Ihril had I >i Ensign n<

i allowed to

testify, the outcome of the trial would have been any different. The evidence that
the surgeon was in an unfit, dangerous condition at the time he operated on Mrs.
Haase was overwhelming.

Ensign was only one of some 20 witnesses to

offer opinions and observations as to the surgeon's apparent impairment. More
specifically, at least two other witnesses, orthopedic surgeon William Stryker and
Richard Jackson, testified as she did that the surgeon's operative report was
grossly "nonsensical". (Tr. 1263-1283 and 474-554). Their testimony rendered
her opinion as to the operative report merely cumulative.
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VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING
REFERENCE TO THE SURGEON'S TREATMENT AT
DAY SPRING BECAUSE HIS TREATMENT THERE
WAS HIGHLY RELEVANT TO WHETHER THE
HOSPITAL WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO
PROTECT MRS. HAASE FROM A DANGEROUSLY
IMPAIRED SURGEON.
The hospital has not identified any particular passage from the trial record
containing a reversibly erroneous reference to the surgeon's treatment at Day
Spring. Such failure should itself defeat the hospital's claim.
In his pretrial deposition, the hospital's CEO testified he had not been
aware the surgeon had been treated at Day Spring.9 In his trial testimony, he
initially claimed to have first learned of the surgeon's in-patient treatment at Day
Spring during his deposition in this case. (Tr. 196). However, he eventually
admitted he had learned of the surgeon's Day Spring stay before the surgeon
operated on Mrs. Haase 6 months later and that this was contrary to his
deposition testimony. (See Tr. 197). Reference to the Day Spring treatment was
necessary to impeach the hospital's CEO. Reference to the surgeon's treatment
at Day Spring was appropriate. In fact, admission of the Day Spring treatment
records themselves would have been appropriate. See Section II, Argument I,
infra.
9

The records themselves suggest in no fewer than 5 places that the
surgeon had been sent to Day Spring for treatment by the hospital! See fn. 11,
infra.
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SECTION ONE
THE TRIAL COURT MADE REVERSIBLY
ERRONEOUS RULINGS IN FAVOR OF THE HOSPITAL.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER AUTHENTICATED
RECORDS OF THE DECEASED SURGEON'S
TREATMENT AT DAY SPRING WHEN THOSE
RECORDS WERE OFFERED A) TO SHOW WHAT
THE HOSPITAL COULD AND SHOULD HAVE
KNOWN; AND B) TO REBUT THE HOSPITAL'S
CLAIM IT HAD NEITHER REQUESTED NOR
REQUIRED HIM TO SUBMIT TO TREATMENT AT
DAY SPRING.
Rulings on the admissibility ul evidence are generally reviewable undei an
abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 613 (Utah App.
1997), affd, 983 P.d 975 (Utah 1998). Mrs. Haase submits the trial court acted
beyviiul llu) hounds ol leasonabilily in iHiisinu, admission ol tho surgeon's Day
Spring treatment records.
The trial court's refusal to admit selected portions of the surgeon's
treatment records in the Day Spring program was based on lack of evidence that
the hospital knew what those records contained before the surgeon operated on
Mrs. Haase. (Tr. 1196). The key question, however, isn't solely what the

Day Spring. The records themselves indicate in numerous places that the
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surgeon had been sent to Day Spring by hospital representatives.10 It is strongly
inferable from the Day Spring records that the hospital should have learned both
of the specifics and of the outcome of the surgeon's in-patient treatment there.
Having sent him, the hospital had an obligation to find out if the treatment was
successful and, if the care providers at Day Spring recommended further
treatment, whether he was submitting to the following up care he needed. Jurors
could well have found the records highly useful in determining whether the
hospital met its duty to monitor and follow up on the treatment it recommended.
The hospital could have discovered the contents of the Day Spring records

10

Day Spring chart entries include these:

"The medical staff at his hospital have requested an evaluation concerning
his possible drinking and substance abuse."
"The hospital medical staff has requested this evaluation."
"Here now per referral from 1° [primary care ] M.D."
"Admits that hospital he works at requested a CD [chemical dependency]
evaluation."
"13. Have you ever gotten into trouble at work because of your drinking or
drug use?
/ [Yes]."
(See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 18 and Addendum 2, attached, at pp. 6,10, 24,46,
107).
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under the authorization the surgeon signed in his ( ledenlialing application

11

11

Although the hospital was unable to provide or authenticate a complete
copy of its entire credentialing file on the surgeon, it did produce, through various
witnesses, portions of the credentialing file. One document produced as part of
the surgeon's credentialing file is entitled "Specific Consent to Information
Exchange and Conditions of Consideration in Connection with . . .
Appointment/Re-appointment." (Emphasis added) This document, apparently
signed by the surgeon on 8-15-94, provides in pertinent part:
I understand that it is necessary . . . to obtain detailed
information about me in order to complete the Process.
I understand that such information may be private,
sensitive, privileged, and otherwise confidential. It is my
request, and I hereby give my consent, that such
information be disclosed.
. . . I intend that this consent include all information
that reflects on my ability to safely, competently,
and professionally perform the professional
activities .. . and/or... participation I have requested .

I intend that this consent extend to all persons,
institutions, and entities that have such information
about me, including:... hospitals,... and to persons or
committees associated with any of these. In connection
with the Process, I also give my consent for all such
persons, institutions, and entities to express their
opinion(s) about me and to make recommendations
about my professional skills, conduct, and ability to
perform the clinical privileges . . . I have applied for. I
also give my consent for [Ashley Valley Medical Center]
and [its] medical staffs, officers, agents, committees,
and employees involved in the Process to receive and
act upon all such information, opinions, and
recommendations in connection with the Process.
(See Addendum !l attached)
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One of Mrs. Haase's principal reasons for offering the Day Spring chart
was to rebut the hospital's assertion that it was unaware the surgeon had
received in-patient treatment at Day Spring. Dr. Ace Madsen was both the
surgeon's primary care physician and a member of the hospital's medical staff.
At the time the surgeon was credentialed, he was a member of the Credentialing
Committee, the Medical Executive Committee and the hospital's Governing
Board. (Tr. 227, 660, 973-74,1104-05). Dr. Madsen claimed at trial to have
been unaware that the surgeon had sought and obtained treatment at Day Spring
and he denied having referred the surgeon to the Day Spring program. (Tr. 1072).
The Day Spring records rebut that testimony. (See fn. 10, supra). Mrs. Haase
should have been allowed to confront him with the Day Spring entries indicating
the surgeon had been sent to the Day Spring program by his primary care
physician.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW THE JURY TO HEAR THE TESTIMONY OF
DR. RAYMOND MIDDLETON, WHO TREATED THE
SURGEON AT DAY SPRING AND COULD
AUTHENTICATE THE SURGEON'S PERTINENT DAY
SPRING TREATMENT RECORDS.
In his February 1, 2002 deposition, Dr. Middleton authenticated the written
memorialization of the history and physical he took of the surgeon in September
of iswfi rip acknowledged having learned the medical staff at the hospital had
requested an evaluation concerning the surgeon's drinking and substance abuse.
(Middleton depo at 6). He also acknowledged he had learned the surgeon
suffered from frequent chronic migraine headaches. He determined the
surgeon's "recent memory was impaired" and "his judgment has probably been
poor". (Middleton depo at 9,10). His treatment plan for the surgeon included
attendance at AA [Alcoholics Anonymous] and NA [Narcotics Anonymous]
meetings and he expected the surgeon In attend such meetings aflei his in
patient stay at Day Spring. (Middleton depo at 12). Dr. Middleton confirmed
there were indication throughout the record that people at the hospital had
referred the sinneon to Hav Sprint)

I}'

.Hoton depo at I'M He also conlirineil

the surgeon had acknowledged needing a career change and indicating he
needed "at least 8 more months working as an orthopedic surgeon to avoid an
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extreme catastrophe with the IRS, family and other issues".12 (Middleton depo at
21).
Dr. Middleton confirmed the surgeon had admitted having a chemical
dependency problem as a result of long term use of opiates. (Middleton depo at
23). Dr. Middleton prescribed ongoing psychiatric treatment with Dr. Collins,
following the surgeon's discharge. (Middleton depo at 27-29).
Dr. Middleton's deposition testimony shed considerable light on the
surgeon's condition 6 months prior to his undertaking surgery on Mrs. Haase and
was therefore relevant. The jury reasonably could have found information he
possessed concerning the surgeon's condition included information the hospital
should have obtained, if it did not.

In addition, his testimony rebutted the

hospital's assertion it had not requested or demanded the surgeon go to Day
Spring. (See p. 27, supra, and fn. 10, supra).
The jury should have been allowed to hear Dr. Middleton's testimony.

12

The surgeon operated on Mrs. Haase within that 8 month period following
his acknowledgment that he needed a career change.
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THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO
CONSIDER AN ASSESSMENT OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AGAINST THE HOSPITAL.
Mrs. Haase's complaint specifically requests punitive damages. (R. 6, 4).
Mrs. Haase's Proposed Special Verdict Form included a question and a space for
punitive damages. (R. 857-859). Mrs. Haase's Proposed Jury Instructions
included an instruction on punitive damages. (Exhibit 13 to appellant's opening
brief). The trial conil howevci, ilei lined to allmi llio \\i\\ In i.:onsuiei punitive
damages. In doing so, it erred.
The trial court's refusal to allow the jury to consider punitive damages was
tantamount to M directed vi idicl uh Mis lipase s punitive d,nii,-jqe claim In
reviewing such a decision, the evidence must be examined in a light most
favorable to the adverse party and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence
or the inferences to he drawn thereliom which would support a finding in favor of
the adverse party, the directed verdict can not be sustained. Management
Comm. of Gravstone Pine Home Owners Association Ex Rel Owners of
Condominiums v. Gravstone Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). A directed
verdict is only appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a matter of law,
that reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be determined from the
evidence presented. I

is issue, then, presents a question of law to be

reviewed for correctness only.
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By statute, punitive damages may be considered and awarded when there
is clear and convincing evidence that a party's acts or omissions manifest a
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
UCA §78-18-1 (1)(a). During the nine day trial, clear and convincing evidence
was presented in rich abundance that the hospital was fully aware that Dr.
Hawkes was a dangerously impaired surgeon who suffered from a host of
physical, emotional and financial problems, regularly consumed a dangerously
high volume of narcotic pain medication and was so impaired that the hospital's
CEO arranged for hospitalization and referred him to the Division of Professional
Licensing's Impaired Physician Program one year before he operated on Mrs.
Haase. The hospital began administering drug screen tests on Dr. Hawkes as
early as 1993 and continued such testing past the surgeon's operation on Mrs.
Haase but failed to retain (or at least produce) the results of those tests.
Dr. Hawkes' surgeries brought to the hospital a revenue of one million
dollars per year. (Tr. 253). There is strong evidence that the hospital placed
profits before patients and put its own financial welfare ahead of the welfare of
both Dr. Hawkes and his patients.13
13

In closing argument, the jurors were asked: "Which is better: An
impaired surgeon or no surgeon?." The evidence clearly and convincingly
showed the answer in this instance to be: "It depends on whether you are the
patient or the hospital". Perversely, the more impaired the surgeon, the more
revenue that flowed to the hospital. In the case of Mrs. Haase, her error-filled
surgery required her to remain in the hospital several days. If the surgeon's
judgment and skills had not been impaired, Mrs. Haase either would not have had
-32-

Several witnesses confirmed the existence of numerous red flag indicators
of a dangerously impaired surgeon. The trial court allowed 15 of those "red flags"
to be admitted into evidence. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 9; See Addendum 1, attached).
The hospital .allowed I'Ji I lawkes ID pertonn surgeries at the hospital
before he had even submitted his application for privileges! (Tr. 1410) The
hospital's own credentialing expert, Hugh Greeley, admitted that it would be
reckless for a Hospital to permit a physician to perform surgery before it had
verified that the physician was competent to perform sundry

( T i 1436 $7 c >e

also 1411).
Allhough Mi. Greeley claimed he lacked expertise to opine on whether it
would also be reckless for a hospital

.

^gularly used

opiates to operate on patients (Tr. 1437), other witnesses testified that a surgeon
on opiate pain medications was extremely dangerous and the combination of
such medication wilh prrsoiiption slumping ineilicalion (winch the surgeon was
consuming) was "dynamite". (Tr. 1282).
There was ample evidence to support a jury award of punitive damages.
[he trial nunt erioci as a matter ol law in letiising ID allow the jury to consider a
punitive damage assessment.

the surgery or would have been fit to leave the hospital immediately following (he
surgery.
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
A STATUTORY PEER-REVIEW PRIVILEGE
PRECLUDED MRS. HAASE'S INTRODUCTION OF
EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY AGAINST THE
HOSPITAL WHEN A) THE INFORMATION
CONCERNED THE SURGEON'S FITNESS, NOT HIS
PERFORMANCE, AND B) THE"PEER" UNDER
REVIEW WAS DECEASED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.
Utah's medical peer-review statute protects certain information from
disclosure on the theory and policy ground that health care providers will be
better able to improve medical care if their peer-review studies and discussions
are kept secret. UCA §26-25-3. The peer-review privilege, however, is to be
narrowly construed. Benson ex rel v. IHC Hosps. 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993). Our
Supreme Court has held that the privilege protects only documents prepared
specifically for peer-review purposes, not documents that might or could be used
in the peer-review process. Id.

See also McCall v. Henry Medical Center. Inc..

551 S.E.2d 739, 739, 742-43 (Ga. App. 2001) and Greenwood v. Wierdsma.. 741
P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987).
A critical distinction exists between peer-review and credentialing. Peerreview measures a provider's performance. Credentialing inquires about a
provider's fitness. Even the hospital's credentialing expert admitted the
distinction between credentialing and peer-review. (Tr. 1365). He further
admitted that the credentialing and reappointing process includes assessments
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"as to whether en urn .1 physicians health statu1", would compromise then ability lo
provide safe patient care." (Tr. 1366). He acknowledged that hospitals are
expected to make such assessments as part of the credentialing/reappointment
process (Tr 1366).
Throughout the trial, the hospital was allowed to hide behind the cloak of
peer-review secrecy in dodging pertinent questions and withholding critical
information as to what il knew concerning Ihe surgeon's physical impairments,
drug dependencies and emotional and financial difficulties.14

Its CEO and

14

Mr. Perry gave two-word, "peer-review" stonewalling responses to
questions including these:
"As chief executive officer of the hospital did you personally become
aware that Dr. Hawkes between '93 and March 12 of '96 had sought
treatment from Ace Madsen?" (Tr. 1172).
"Did you ever contact Dr. Hawkes' physician, Dr. Ace Madsen or
anybody else, to determine whether he may have had a drug
problem during the critical time period we're talking about [1993
through April 15, 1996]?" (Tr. 261).
"Can you tell us whether you passed on to the board the fruits of
your investigation of the high school falling off the horse incident?"
(Tr. 267).
Did you ever report to the governing board about Dr. Hawkes having
gone to rehabilitation for physical, emotional or drug problems? (Tr.
237)
"Did you report to the credentialing committee what Dr. Hawkes had
told you about his falling out with his orthopedic colleagues in Salt
Lake?" (Tr. 1175)
"Did you ever tell anyone on the credentialing committee or the MEC
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attorney claimed the peer-review privilege on no fewer than 21 occasions during
the trial. (Tr. 171, 189, 196,204,206,207,237,265,267,273, 1164, 1172,
1173, 1175). The trial court routinely sustained the peer-review privilege
assertions. (See, e.g., Tr. 207, 235, 261, 262, 266, 267, 275).
The peer-review privilege is to protect the care provider whose
performance is under review by his peers. In this instance, the care provider
died several years before the case came to trial. A major purpose of the peerreview privilege evaporates when the person under review is no longer living.
If this case is to be retried, the trial court should be given clear direction
that no information concerning the surgeon's qualifications and fitness to perform
invasive surgeries on patients at the hospital are to be protected on the ground of
peer-review privilege. Queries pertaining to a surgeon's fitness fall under
credentialing/reappointment matters, unlike queries concerning a surgeon's
infection and morbidity rates, which may well be peer-review matters.

about your awareness that Dr. Hawkes had some serious emotional
problems?" (Tr. 1173).
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SECTION THREE
THE JURY'S CLEAR INTENT THAT MRS. HAASE
RECEIVE ITS FULL $820,000 DAMAGE AWARD
SHOULD BE HONORED.
I.
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
BISHOP V. GEN TEC. INC.
Whether a trial court properly interpreted the effect of a prior judicial
decision is a question of law which is to be reviewed for correctness with no
deference given to the trial court's determination. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins.
Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996).
There no longer can be any question that the controlling law in Utah now
dictates that the jury's intent, above all else, is to be honored. Whenever
necessary, a "jury's verdict should be amended to reflect the true intent of
the jury." Bishop v. Gen Tec. Inc.. 48 P.3d at 227 (Utah 2002).
The hospital asks this court to disregard the actual holding and precise
ruling of our Supreme Court in Bishop and instead focus on New York case law.
(Hospital's brief, p. 28). The hospital also asks this court to distinguish clerical
error from judicial error in a manner inconsistent with the express distinction
made by our Supreme Court. Unequivocally and unreservedly our Supreme
Court has stated that "accurately recording the intent of the jury in its calculations
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of the damage award constitutes a correction of a clerical error, not a judicial
error". Bishop at 227. Here, 6 of the 7 jurors who returned to court 6 weeks
after the trial at the trial court's direction declared, after learning the court had
interpreted their special verdict in a way which gave Mrs. Haase only $246,000 of
their damage award, that they had not accurately recorded their actual intent
on the special verdict form. (Tr. 1358 at pp. 24-25). Those same 6 jurors
responded "No" to the specific query: "was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase
only $246,000 for the damages she sustained as a result of the hospital's
negligence?" (R. 1358, p. 19, lines 1-18, 22-25).

II.
JUROR MISUNDERSTANDING WAS LIMITED
SOLELY TO MATTERS FLOWING FROM THE
INTRODUCTION OF FAULT ASSESSMENT AGAINST
THE SURGEON (AFTER THE JURY HAD BEEN TOLD
REPEATEDLY THE CASE WAS NOT ABOUT THE
SURGEON'S NEGLIGENCE).
The hospital mistakes Mrs. Haase's purpose in explaining the likely cause
of juror misunderstanding over its assessment of fault against the surgeon and
the effect of that assessment on its damage award. Mrs. Haase does not seek to
assign error with respect to the adequacy or inadequacy of jury instructions and
special verdict forms. Her purpose has been merely to explain why the trial court
and the jury did not share the same understanding of the jury's damage award.
-38-

The trial was not about the surgeon's negligence. (Tr. 2) The hospital
asked the court to remove the surgeon's negligence from consideration at trial.
The court granted the hospital's request. (Tr. 1198, lines 16-17, 21,1200,121213).
Our Supreme Court recently declared:
A comparative negligence analysis necessarily involves
an assessment of the relative degree of negligence of
both parties. Indeed, in order to compare negligence,
the trier of fact must assess both parties' conduct.
Harding v. Bell. 460 UAR 3, 5, fn. 4, 202 UT 108 (Utah 2002). Here, the jury had
no basis for comparing the negligence of the hospital with the surgeon because
the surgeon's negligence was not before it.15 It is clearly understandable that the
jury intended for Mrs. Haase to receive its full $820,000 damage award, as that
damage award reflected the damages flowing from the only negligence it had
been given opportunity to consider.
It may be significant that although the jury had no knowledge of the amount
of money the surgeon's representatives had paid Mrs. Haase in settlement three
years prior to this trial, that sum, when added to the jury's $820,000 award
produces a total recovery just $3,100 off the economist's projection of Mrs.

15

It was the hospital who asked the court to remove the surgeon's
negligence from the jury's consideration. The court granted that request without
regard to Mrs. Haase's position. Mrs. Haase should not be punished by having to
endure another trial when she did nothing to contribute to the misunderstanding.
-39-

Haase's actual special damages.

It is apparent, therefore, that the jury was

conservatively wise beyond its knowledge in awarding Mrs. Haase $820,000 for
the hospital's negligence.

CONCLUSION
Under controlling Utah case law, the jury's true intent governs as to the
damages Mrs. Haase is to receive for the hospital's negligence. The jury's intent
to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 for the hospital's negligence is overwhelmingly
clear from the jurors' post-trial declarations.
The trial court committed no reversible errors in favor of Mrs. Haase during
the trial. All of the evidence the jury was allowed to hear against the hospital was
both relevant and reliable. Much of the evidence the hospital claims should not
have been admitted was largely cumulative and did not likely impact the result.
The trial court did make reversibly erroneous rulings in favor of the hospital
during the trial in: refusing to allow the jury to consider authenticated records of
the deceased surgeon's Day Spring treatment records; refusing to allow the jury
to hear the testimony of Dr. Raymond Middleton, who treated the surgeon at Day
Spring; concluding Utah's statutory peer-review privilege justified the hospital's
dodging numerous pertinent questions about its awareness of the surgeon's
16

See fn 5 on p. 8 of Mrs. Haase's brief in chief. Counsel reveals this fact
as an officer of this Court in full awareness of both the penalty of perjury and the
risk of violating a confidentiality term.
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unfitness; and refusing to allow the jury to consider an assessment of punitive
damages against the hospital.
Although errors which favored the hospital may well justify a new trial, Mrs.
Haase does not seek a new trial. On the contrary, she submits requiring the outof-town judge, attorneys, expert witnesses and fact witnesses to return to Vernal
for a two week trial would entail colossal expense, inconvenience and trauma.
By this point, just impaneling a Uintah County jury without knowledge or bias
concerning this case would be tremendously time-consuming and expensive, if
not impossible.
Neither Mrs. Haase nor the jury did anything wrong. Mrs. Haase should
not be punished with having to endure a new trial.

Ordering a new trial would

punish Mrs. Haase for mistakes she did not make and for a misunderstanding
she did not create. By the clear weight of evidence, the jurors' post-trial
declarations resolve any doubt concerning their true intent. That intent should be
honored.

-41-

RELIEF REQUEST
Mrs. Haase requests the relief she be granted include:
1.

An order substituting the jury verdict component of the judgment from

$246,000 to $820,000;
2.

An order awarding her all costs incurred by her in this appeal, in addition to

the $4,570.19 in taxable costs awarded by the trial court;
3.

Interest on the total judgment amount at the pre-judgment legal interest

rate of 10% per annum or at the judgment interest rate, whichever the court
deems more appropriate, pursuant to UCA §78-24-44 and 15-1-1.
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ADDENDUM TO REPLY BRIEF
MRS. HAASE'S RESPONSE TO THE HOSPITAL'S
OPPOSITION TO MRS. HAASE'S OVERLENGTH
BRIEF AND THE ALLEGED RAISING OF "NEW"
ISSUES.
The hospital cannot seriously contend surprise by Mrs. Haase's evidence
issues (Section Two, supra). On pages 2 and 3 of her initial brief, Mrs. Haase
identified nine issues she wished to preserve. Each of the four issues raised in
Section II of this brief are identified as trial court errors on those pages of her
opening brief. Because the hospital is allowed to file the last brief, it will not be
prejudiced by responding to those issues in that brief.
After stating her opposition to remand for retrial and identifying the specific
unfavorable evidentiary rulings she contests, Mrs. Haase stated her intent to
defer briefing of her evidence issues to the submission she would file in response
to the hospital's cross-appeal (see appellant's opening brief, p.3). The hospital's
cross-appeal, unlike Mrs. Haase's opening brief, deals with trial evidence issues.
Mrs. Haase's opening brief was less than 37 pages in length - nearly 14 pages
shorter than it could have been. The combined length of Mrs. Haase's two briefs
(excluding this addendum) exceeds the total page limits normally allowed under
Rule 24(g), URAP by only 4 pages.
The hospital's opening brief was nearly 7 pages shorter than allowed. Mrs.
Haase has no objection to this Court's receiving from the hospital a final brief of
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up to 37 pages in length. If it does so, each party will have had equal opportunity
and space to brief the issues properly before this Court.
The hospital should have adequate time and space to respond to the
issues identified but not briefed in Mrs. Haase's opening brief. Mrs. Haase will
not oppose a motion from the hospital for leave to file a final brief longer than 25
pages. Under the circumstances, such a motion should be granted. Each side
should have equal opportunity adequately to address the issues raised by the
other.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 2003.
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 9 (RED FLAG INDICATORS OF AN
IMPAIRED SURGEON)

SELECTED PAGES OF PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT 18
(THE SURGEON'S DAY SPRING TREATMENT RECORDS)

CONSENT TO RELEASE OF INFORMATION FOUND IN THE
HOSPITAL'S INCOMPLETE CREDENTIALING FILE ON THE
SURGEON

Tabl

DR. HAWKES
INITIATED HIS
OWN
RECRUITMENT
I PUINTIFPS
I.
EXHIBFT

DR. HAWKES'
APPLICATION PAPERS
LEAVE OUT INFORMATION
ABOUT HIS MOST RECENT
WORK AS A SURGEON

DR. HAWKES' WIFE
REQUESTED
DISABILITY
COVERAGE DUE TO
HIS ARTHRITIS

DR. HAWKES
PERFORMED SURGERY
ON HIMSELF SHORTLY
BEFORE APPLYING TO
ASHELY VALLEY

DR. HAWKES
HAD PAIN
PROBLEMS

OTHER DRS. REPORTED
THAT THEIR
PATIENTS WOULD
NOT BE TREATED BY
DR. HAWKES

DR. HAWKES WAS
TREATED FOR PAIN
AND SLEEP
DEPRIVATION IN
AVMC'S E.R.

GO

5*3

c
> o

03

>

n

GO
GO

O

GO

DR. HAWKES HAD
SERIOUS FINANCIAL
DIFFICULTIES AND
IRS TROUBLES

JAN-06-2003 HON 09=08 AM VERNAL 8TH DIST COURT

FAX NO. 43b m UbB4

DR. HAWKES'
ORTHOPEDIC
COLLEAGUES
HAD NEGATIVE
VIEWS OF HIS
ABILITIES AS A
SURGEON

v. W

DR. HAWKES HAD
TROUBLES WITH HIS
ORTHOPEDIC
COLLEAGUES

JAN-06-2003 MON 09:07 AM VERNAL 8TH D1ST UUUKT

hfi* NU. 4cSb /oa U S M

DR. HAWKES
HAD
DISABLING PAIN
IN 1995 FOR
WHICH HE WAS
HOSPITALIZED
AND AVMC
KNEW IT

r.

uc

DR. HAWKES TRIED TO
GAIN ADMISSION TO A
HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL
GAME ON HORSEBACK
WHILE INEBRIATED

JAN-06-2003 HON 09:08 AH VERNAL 8TH DIST COURT

FAX NO. 435 789 0564

DR. HAWKES
UNDERWENT
INPATIENT
TREATMENT AT
DAYSPRING
IN SEPT. 1995

V. Uci

DR. HAWKES AND AVMC
WERE SUED FOR
MALPRACTICE IN 1995
AND BOTH PAID MONEY
TO THE PATIENT

Tab 2

Selected Portions of Day Spring Treatment Records
Offered into Evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 18
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NAME: HAWKES, THOMAS
ADMITTED: 09-07-95
RAY MIDDLETON, MD

HISTORY & PHYSICAL
MEDICAL HISTORY
PRESENTING COMPLAINT: T m very depressed and I need to control my pain."
PATIENT PROFILE: Thomas is a 50-year-old orthopedic surgeon who was born in Brigham City, and has been
living in Vernal for the last two and a half years. He is LDS by religious profession, and claims that he
is very active in his faith. He is admitted to hospital for evaluation concerning the possible abuse of pain .
medications, particularly benzodiazepines and various narcotic preparations. He was a helicopter pilot
in Vietnam, and was shot down and severely injured. The crash apparently killed all the other occupants
of the helicopter. He continues to have ongoing problems, having fractured his left ankle, ruptured his
liver, chest injuries, severe cervical spine injuries, and has developed arthritis as a result of all these
problems. He has been under the influence of benzodiazepines on a couple of occasions when it was felt
by the people in his town that he might have been drinking. In fact, he denies this. The medical staff
at his hospital have requested an evaluation concerning his possible drinking and substance abuse.
DRUG AND ALCOHOL EFFECTS: Following his rehabilitation from the injuries in Vietnam, he went into
medical school and on into orthopedics. He has practiced in several areas and on a couple of occasions
has been accused of being a drug addict, and either quit or was removed from medical staff. He
apparently is a very hardworking and very adequate surgeon. He has been married for 28 years. He has
ten children. His wife is very concerned about the allegations of substance abuse and possible alcoholism
in her husband. He has never had any legal problems around the substance abuse, but is in some serious
problems with the IRS and withfinancesin general. He currently is living in his own home. There have
been several problems with his health, as noted above. He performs well sexually. He has severe
problems with sleep. His appetite has been poor. His main hobby currently is raising and breaking
horses. With regard to chronic illnesses, he does have chronic arthritis, chronic pain from the injuries
noted above.
PAST HEALTH: He has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, which apparently still bothers him. He
has a long family history and personal history of depression. He has been on various antidepressants.
He has had the usual childhood diseases. He had a very traumatic childhood, being raised by an
alcoholic father and a mother who was not always available to him, either.
SURGERIES: He has had multiple surgeries as a result of his injuries.
ALLERGIES: He complains of season allergies. He may be allergic to morphine and to some of the dyes that
are used in radiological investigations.
FAMILY HISTORY: Father died at 80 of alcoholism. Mother died at 52 of a lymphoma. He has two half
sisters, one of whom is a recovering alcoholic and substance abuser. The other, he is not sure of her
state of health. He has one full sister who lives out of state. She is a substance abuser and a lesbian.
He states there is a good deal of alcoholism on the paternal side of the family, in that all of his paternal
uncles and several of his paternal cousins are dead from alcoholism.
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS
1. SKIN: No rash, itching, moles, sores, hives, cancer, hair, pigmentation.
2. EYES: He wears corrective lenses. No pain, diplopia, scotoma, itch, dryness, infection or redness.
3. EARS: No hearing loss, infection, pain, tinnitus, vertigo.
4. NOSE: No dryness. No bleeding, pain, discharge. No obstruction. Smell normal. No sneezing.
5. MOUTH: No soreness, pain, infection, ulcers, hoarseness, dryness. Gums are clean and healthy, as are
tongue and teeth. Swallowing normal.
6. BREASTS: No discharge, lump, pain, bleeding or infection.
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DISCHARGE SUMMARY
PATIENT NAME:
MEDICAL RECORD NO:
UNIT PROGRAM:
DATE OF ADMISSION:
DATE OF DISCHARGE:
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN:

HAWKES, THOMAS
00-46-50
Dayspring Inpatient
09/07/95
09/12/95
Ray Middleton, M.D.

ADMISSION DIAGNOSES
Axis I

Axis II
Axis HI

Major Depression, Recurrent, Moderate
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Opiate-Derivative Analgesic Abuse/Dependence
Depressive Personality Disorder with Compulsive and Histrionic Features
Status post multiple injuries with resultant surgeries

DISCHARGE DIAGNOSES
Axis I

Axis II
Axis HI

Major Depression, Recurrent, Moderate
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Opiate-Derivative Analgesic Abuse/Dependence
Depressive Personality Disorder with Compulsive and Histrionic Features
Status post multiple injuries with resultant surgeries

CONDITION ON DISCHARGE
Improved physically and mentally over admission status.
HISTORY
Tom is a 50-year-old orthopedic surgeon who has been living in Vernal for the last 2 1/2 years, where
he practices orthopedics. He has been admitted for evaluation concerning the possible abuse of pain and
benzodiazepine-type medications. He was seriously injured when a helicopter he was piloting was shot
down in Vietnam, and he continues to have ongoing problems with arthritis, his abdomen, and his cervical
spine particularly. The hospital medical staff has requested this evaluation.
He has been married for 28 years and has 10 children. His wife is very concerned about the allegations
of substance abuse and possible abuse of alcohol and drugs by her husband. He complains of serious
financial problems. He has difficulty with sleep, and his appetite has been poor.
He has been diagnosed in the past with attention-deficit disorder, and stated that he is deeply depressed
at this time. His family history is positive for alcoholism, in that he had an alcoholic father. One of his
half-sisters is a recovering alcoholic and substance abuser, as is another sister who lives out of state. He
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5770 South 1500 West, Taylorsville, Utah 84123
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DISCHARGE SUMMARY
stated that there is a good deal of alcoholism on the paternal side of the family, in that all of his paternal
uncles and several of his paternal cousins have died from alcoholism.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
Essentially within normal limits. He did have some difficulty with full range of movement in his head
and neck because of his previous injuries. There is scarring around his ankle fracture and surgery, as well
as abdominal scarring from the surgery on his ruptured liver sustained in the helicopter crash.
LABORATORY DATA
Urine toxicology was positive for benzodiazepines and caffeine., SMAC profile showed elevations of
cholesterol and LDH, as well as triglycerides and VLDL cholesterol. RPR was nonreactive. Routine
urinalysis was normal.
HOSPITAL COURSE (Medical)
Medical problems encountered during the course of the patient's hospital stay included:
1.
2.

3.
4.

He did not appear to be under the influence, and required little in the way of detox medications.
Various aches and pains from arthritis and old injuries, for which he has taken enteric-coated
Naprosyn in the past. When taking this kind of medication, he also needs to take Zantac and
Carafate.
Seasonal allergies, which normally respond to Claritin, and appeared to do so at this time.
Depression. He was seen in consultation by a psychologist and a psychiatrist, and trazodone and
Zoloft were ordered for him. These medications will be followed by Dr. Ed Collins.

DAYSPRING TREATMENT COURSE
Following a full-scale evaluation, the patient was discharged from treatment on 09/12/95. Following an
in-depth meeting with his wife, his physician (Dr. Middleton), and myself, (Rick Garrett, clinical
counselor), the decision was reached that the patient would be returned to his hometown with his wife,
where he will continue his medical practice. He has been referred to the Diversion Committee, and in
fact met with the Diversion Committee while here on the Dayspring Unit. An initial interview has been
set up with them, and they will likely be following this case. The patient has also been referred for
one-to-one therapy with Dr. Edgar Collins, and an initial therapy session with Dr. Collins has been
scheduled for Friday, September 22, 1995, at 3 p.m. at the Professional Office Building here at Wasatch
Canyons Hospital.
Because of financial reasons that necessitate the patient returning to work as quickly as possible, it was
felt that the structure that will be provided by the Diversion Committee in association with the one-to-one
therapy would be a reasonable treatment plan for this patient. He is a surgeon in the Vernal, Utah, area.
Having cleared the chemical dependency evaluation here at Dayspring, he is being allowed to return to
work now.
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NAME:

HAWKES, THOMAS

CONSULTATION
REASON FOR CONSULTATION
Psychiatry was asked to see this 50-year-old, married, white, male orthopedic surgeon, father of ten, and
Vietnam veteran, who had been admitted to Wasatch Canyons Hospital Dayspring Program on 09-07-95 as
arranged per Dr. Ray Middieton for evaluation in regards to the patient's use of analgesics. He uses for control
of headaches and orthopedic injuries suffered in a helicopter crash during service in Vietnam.
Because the patient also has a history of depression and has been on various antidepressant medications,
psychiatry was asked to make an evaluation, along with recommendations for treatment.
HISTORY OF THE PRESENT ILLNESS
Approximately three and a half hours were spent obtaining the following information, which will be abbreviated
in this report.
In 1968 the patient was serving as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam. He and a small crew aboard his helicopter
were asked to rescue a small band of men stranded on a hillside in the thick of battle. The rescue took place
under fire. Nine injured men were loaded aboard the helicopter under extremely difficult circumstances. The
helicopter was extensively damaged by enemy gunfire. Despite the patient's best efforts as pilot, the helicopter
crashed. He was the lone survivor, but suffered extensive injuries including burns, fractures of his neck, back,
ankle, and ribs. He was rescued and treated. He spent approximately a year convalescing.
Despite his injuries and associated pain, he was able to complete medical school, residency training in
orthopedic surgery, and sub-specialty in pediatric orthopedics.
Opiate derivative analgesics were utilized for control of episodic pain and after procedures and surgeries of his
neck, back and ankle in attempts to improve function and decrease pain. These were not completely successful
and he describes one surgery to his neck as resulting in complications including Horner's syndrome and
vagotomy.
He continues to complain of headaches, which were worsened recently when he bumped his head while working
on his car. Recent episodes of misuse of medications resulting in excessive sedation and inappropriate
behaviors in public, i.e., falling asleep in a theater requiring his 17-year-old son to help him up out of the
theater and home. Also recently falling off his horse while riding over to see a high school football game.
Patient admits to having taken medications prior to both these episodes, but is vague as to which medications
and the amounts.
Most of the patient's medical career has been in the Service. After retirement he worked for awhile in Salt
Lake City, then opening a practice in Vernal, Utah. He describes doing well, but was recalled into the Service
during the Gulf War. He states that this became afinancialburden in that there was a marked change in
income. He now describes significant financial problems, including problems with the IRS.
According to the patient he has been diagnosed with major depression, along with post traumatic stress disorder
in the past. He has been treated at various times by psychologists for therapy and a psychiatrist for medications
during the patient's career in the military. His most recent psychotropic medications have included Zoloft and
trazodone.
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HAWKES, THOMAS
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS
MCMI-III: The profile appears to be valid. Patient does have a very high score, however, on the
Desirability Scale, indicating that his answers may have been influenced by a desire to be liked or present
a positive image. Among Axis I Scales, the patient demonstrated elevations on post traumatic stress disorder
and somatoform disorder scales.
Among Axis II diagnoses, the patient demonstrated a depressive personality disorder with histrionic and
compulsive features.
Suicide Probability Scale: The SPS is significant for very high levels of hostility. The patient is a mild risk
for suicide according to this instrument.
Beck Depression Inventory: The BDI indicates a mild mood disturbance. Somatic symptoms (problems
sleeping, with fatigue, decreased appetite, health problems) are prominent.
Alcohol Readiness for Change Inventory: This scale indicates that the patient is currently in an action
oriented mode, indicating that he at least is reporting that he is ready to take steps towards treating his
current problem.
CLINICAL INTERVIEW
The patient indicates that he has come to treatment because he believes he "recognizes signs" that he is an
addict, and does not want this to precipitate problems in his marriage and life. There is no history of early
problems with learning or attention deficit disorder. Family history is positive for alcoholism and depression.
Patient reports that he was involved in at least two serious accidents. The first occurred when he was about
18 years old.. He was in the back of a pickup truck which hit a tree. Patient reports that he was the only
survivor from among five passengers. In the second case, the patient was flying a helicopter in 1968 in
Vietnam and was shot down. He received back and leg injuries when the helicopter crashed, and suffered
severe burns when the helicopter exploded. He was, however, thrown free and again was the only survivor
from among about 13 other passengers and patients. Patient reports long history of feeling lonely and
depressed. He indicates that he has always considered "suicide as an option," but does not believe he has
ever been a danger to himself. He denies that he is a danger to himself at this time. Patient appears to
have post traumatic stress disorder secondary to his experiences in Vietnam. He has repetitive recurring
nightmares times two (seeing a young girl die from a grenade explosion and seeing a village massacre in
which the Viet Cong apparently came into the village and eviscerated 30+ children). He has been treated
for post traumatic stress disorder, and has had a number of treatment trials of antidepressants. He indicates
that when he has been on trazodone that it is a very effective antidepressant for him.
SEVERITY / JUSTIFICATION
The patient's substance abuse has caused significant occupational, family, psychological, and interpersonal
problems. These problems have been severe enough to require treatment in a structured inpatient or
outpatient rehabilitation program at this time. The patient is a mild risk to himself according to the Suicide
Probability Scale.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSION
AXIS I
AXIS II
AXIS III
AXIS IV
AXISV

Opiate Abuse and Dependence
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Moderate, Continuous
Depressive Personality Disorder With Compulsive and Histrionic Features
See Medical History and Physical: Multiple Physical Problems Secondary to his Injury in
Vietnam
Problems: Psychological, Family, Occupational, Substance Abuse, Financial
GAF: 55-60

TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

A structured inpatient program would appear to be most beneficial for the patient at this time.
During his treatment the patient should participate in individual therapy, group therapy, and didactic
lectures to address the issues surrounding substance abuse and to gain an education in addiction.
Family therapy would also be an important part of treatment. Treatments geared towards improved
self-esteem, improved coping and problem solving abilities, stress management, appropriate anger
management, assertiveness, and improved communication skills may be helpful for this patient.
"Supportive relationships with AA and/or NA should be established.

2.

The patient has moderate, continuous post traumatic stress disorder. He should consider counseling
for this problem. Sometimes patients with depressive symptoms secondary to post traumatic stress
disorder respond to older antidepressants which tend to be more sedating since sleep disturbance
secondary to nightmares is often a significant problem. Patient reports that he has done well on
trazodone in the past, and this medication, or possibly nortriptyline, may be considered. Individual
counseling for post traumatic stress disorder may also be worth considering.

3.

Patient has extensive experience with various pain programs. He does appear to do well when
actively enrolled, and referral to Pain Clinic or concurrent treatment, might be considered.

4.

By patient's report he has not engaged in aggressive, active program of physical therapy.
Participation in programs such as the Spine Clinic at Cottonwood Hospital may also be considered.

(
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DAYSPRING QUESTIONNAIRE ABOUT DRINKING & DRUG

Do you feel you are a normal drinker, cr that ycur use cf
drugs is normal?
Have you awakened the morning after some drinking or drug
use the night before and found that you could not
remember a part of the evening before?
Does your spouse (or parents) ever worry or complain
about your drinking or drug use?
Car. you stop drinking or using d^ugs without a struggle?
Do you ever feel bad about your drinking or drug use?
Do friends or relatives think you are a normal drinker or
that your use of drugs is normal?
Are you always able to stop drinking or using drugs when
you want to?
Have you ever attended a meeting of Alcoholics Anonymous
(AA) or Narcotics Anonymous?
Have you ever gotten into fights while drinking cr using
drugs?
Has your drinking or drug use ever caused problems with
you and your spouse?
Has your spouse (or any other family member) ever gone
for help about your drinking cr drug use?
Have you ever lost friends or girlfriends/boyfriends
because of ycur drinking cr drug use?
Have you ever gotten into trouble at work because of your
drinking or drug use?
Have you ever lost a job because of your drinking or drug
u?e?
Have you ever neglected your obligations, your family, or
your work for two or more days in a row because of ycur
drinking or drug use?
Do you drink or use drugs before noon fairly often?
Have you ever been told that you have liver trouble cr
cirrhosis?
Have you ever had delirium tremens (DT's), severe
shaking, heard voices, or seen things that weren't there
after drinking or drug use?
Have you ever -gone to anyone for help about your drinking
or drug use?
Have you ever been in a hospital because of your drinking
or drug use?
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I am being referred for treatment of:
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I hereby grant permission to Wasatch Canyons Hospital to contact the individual/Or agency listed above to determine
whether client contact occurred as planned and whether referral was
^XMSM&S^

Witness:
ACCEPTING INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY
Name:
Agency:
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Phone:
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was referred to you for treatmen

of
In order to maintain an adequate record of our client's continuing treatment, we request the following information
1. Did client contact you and make an appointment? • Yes • No
2. If so, did client keep his/her appointment? • Yes • No
3. Was it appropriate that this client was referred to you for treatment? • Yes • No
Why or why not?

4. Was your agency able to meet the client's need for assistance? Q Yes • No
Why or why not?

Thank you for your timely response.
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in 10 miormation Lxchange and Conditu
or Consideration
in Connection with
IHC Appointment/Reappointment, Employment, and/or Participation.

I am applying or reapplying for medical staff membership, clinical privileges, employment, or panel participation
at one or more IHC facilities, entities, operations, or services. The scope of such application or reapplication is determined
by other documents. Such application(s) or reapplication(s) involve an IHC hospital, some other facility or operation of
IHC Health Services, Inc., the IHC Physician Division, and/or IHC Health Plans and its affiliated companies. Such IHC
facilities, entities, operations, and services, together with their medical staff(s) or equivalent provider organizations, and their
governing boards, officers, administrators, and employees, are referred to in this document as "IHC entities" or singly as
an "IHC entity." I understand that IHC entities are required to compile information so that they can make a fully informed
decision about me and my relationship or potential relationship with them. This document is intended to facilitate that
process. For convenience in this document, I refer to the processes of obtaining verification of my credentials, checking
my background, and of considering me for initial or continuing medical staff membership, clinical privileges, employment,
or panel participation (as appropriate) as the "Process." I intend that this document apply to the Process in each IHC entity
to which I am applying or reapplying. I understand that the Process may involve IHC Medical Staff Services providing
assistance to the IHC entities to which I have applied or reapplied.
1.

I have received or have had the opportunity to request, and I have had the opportunity to read, the medicalstaff
and hospital bylaws, fair hearing plan, rules and regulations, and/or the other employment or participation
documents for each IHC entity to which I am applying. I acknowledge that such documents apply to me both in
connection with the Process and in connection with my medical staff membership, clinical privileges, employment^
or panel participation, if granted, for each IHC entity involved.

2.

On all applications) to IHC entities, I have provided true, complete, and accurate information in connection with
the Process. I represent to each IHC entity that such information provides an accurate, fair, and complete picture
of my professional background, training, and experience for all the periods of time specified on the forms I have
filled out I acknowledge that any material omission or misstatement of information on such documents may be
grounds for terminating my relationship with an IHC entity.

3.

If granted or extended medical staff membership, clinical privileges, employment, and/or panel participation, I agree
to abide by the bylaws, requirements, rules, and regulations of each IHC entity with which I am involved. I
understand that my professional practice is subject to state and federal laws and regulations, and that persons,
institutions, and entities involved in the Process may be protected by state and federal laws designed to encourage
and protect good faith peer review and quality assurance activities.

4.

I understand that it is necessary for each IHC entity to obtain detailed information about me in order to complete
the Process. I understand that such information may be private, sensitive, privileged, and otherwise confidential.
It is my request, and I hereby give my consent, that such information be disclosed to IHC entities and received by
them in the manner described in this document.
The information that may be disclosed shall include information about me that bears upon any of the following:
my education, post-graduate specialty training, board certification, experience, competence, professional conduct,
ethics, ability to work with others, quality assurance data and information, hospital and other affiliation(s) (such
as other professional practice settings or participation with other health plans), utilization data, clinical privileges,
disciplinary actions, malpractice coverage, claims history, judgements and settlements paid, litigation experience,
state licensure, and controlled substance licensure. I intend that this consent include all information that reflects
on my ability to safely, competently, and professionally perform the professional activities, employment, and/or
panel participation I have requested with each IHC entity.
I intend that this consent extend to all persons, institutions, and entities that have such information about me,
including: colleges, universities, professional societies, hospitals, specialty boards, practice groups, clinics, insurance
companies, partnerships, professional corporations, and employers, and to persons and committees associated with
any of these. In connection with the Process, I also give my consent for all such persons, institutions, and entities
to express their opinion(s) about me and to make recommendations about my professional skills, conduct, and
ability to perform the clinical privileges, or job I have applied for. I also give my consent for the IHC entities and
their medical staffs, officers, agents, committees, and employees involved in the Process to receive and act upon
all such information, opinions, and recommendations in connection with the Process.

I recognize that the free exchange of the types of information, opinions, and recommendations identified in this
document: is a necessary pan of each facility(s) credential ing, recredentialing, privileging, and peer review processes
I realize, however, that the threat of litigation and liability tends, as a practical matter, to discourage the exchange
of these types of information. As a result, it is my purpose and intention to induce and encourage others to do
the things identified in this document by removing the threat of litigation and liability as a result of their good
faith actions to provide information to the Process on my behalf. To that end, I intend that the p^nnc
institutions, and entities identified above will rely on this document as my consent to their actionfe) and as my
release from liability and promise not to subjea them to legal claims and lawsuits as a result of their good faith
efforts to do the things described in this document, which I acknowledge to be for my benefit to facilitate th<*
Process. I intend that this paragraph will apply both to persons, institutions, and entities supplying information,
opinions, and recommendations to the facility(s), medical staff(s) and to all persons, committees, and entities
involved in the Process for the facility(s), medical staff(s) and IHC Health Plans.
I understand that signing this document is an important part of the Process and that any change in this document
as provided to me will cause my application or request to be incomplete and will delay the Process.
I intend that a copy of this document may be relied upon as if it were the original.

DrThnma ^ 4 ^ c ? ^ / f ^
Printed Name

Address

Thomas A. Hawkes M.D.
Pediatric & Adult Orthopedic Surgery
175 North 100 West #204
Vernal. Utah 84078

